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Modernism’s Legacy: Dialogue, Objectivity, and Justice in  
Mark Bevir’s Democratic Governance 
 
In Democratic Governance, Mark Bevir argues that recent developments in the theory and 
practice of British politics have their intellectual roots in wider trends in the academic study of 
society and politics. In particular, he argues, the rise in what he and others have called ‘the new 
governance’ – that is, the shift in Britain and elsewhere away from centralised policy making and 
implementation by state institutions toward policy networks in which the state is merely one actor 
among many – has emerged as a direct consequence of the rise of ahistorical, universalist social 
science methodologies (Bevir, 2010; see also e.g. R. Rhodes, 1996, 1997). These 
methodologies, he suggests, create an intellectual environment in which it is assumed that policy 
decisions are best made by experts rather than citizens, and that ‘good governance’ is 
appropriately measured in terms of the efficiency with which policy decisions are made and 
implemented, rather than the extent to which they reflect the democratic will of the citizens who 
are to be subject to them. The rise of modernist social science has therefore stifled democratic 
decision making, he argues, by suggesting (a) that good decision making requires the possession 
of certain objective facts about society and the people within it, (b) that not everyone will possess 
these facts, and that, therefore, (c) political decisions should be made by certain people and not 
others. The upshot of this, he argues, is that while policy making in Britain would appear to have 
become increasingly democratic and inclusive in recent years - as a result of the increased 
involvement of non-state actors, interest groups, and lobby organisations - the power to make 
policy decisions on a range of issues has in fact been centralised among expert individuals and 
groups, to the detriment of democracy.  
 
Bevir argues against this trend, suggesting that we should reject both the decline in democratic 
governance that has characterised British political life in recent years, and the modernist social 
science methodologies which have fuelled it. Once we acknowledge that modernist social science 
cannot provide the kind of expertise that its defenders think it can, he argues, then the justification 
for removing citizens from governance, and from policy making and implementation in particular, 
is undermined. Bevir thus concludes that social and political scientists should adopt 
methodologies which can better cope with the contingencies of lived social experience than those 
modernist approaches which seek to suppress or elide them. He also argues that, in doing so, 
social scientists might help to democratise governance by establishing a social, political, and 
intellectual environment in which the views, aspirations, and insights of citizens themselves might 
shape the formation and delivery of those policies that effect them. 
 
Bevir’s argument is compeling, complex and wide-ranging, and explicitly weaves together two of 
his enduring preoccupations, namely, the changes in the processes of decision making and policy 
formation in Britain over the past three decades, and the appropriate methods by which 
knowledge of social and political life might be gained. (see Bevir, 1999, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 
2006c; Bevir & Rhodes, 2003; Bevir, Rhodes, & Weller, 2003). His argument is also far-reaching, 
drawing upon and contributing to debates in political and social science, political theory, history, 
and philosophy. His vision of politics, society, and their study is controversial. It is therefore not 
possible to comment on Bevir’s argument in its entirety. Instead, I discuss two central claims in 
the context of recent developments in the academic literature on democracy and liberalism, and 
in British politics, in the hope that in doing so it might be possible to evaluate Bevir’s claims more 
widely. The claims I wish to discuss in some detail are (a) that modernist social and political 
theory presupposes objective standards of reasoning which are incoherent and mistaken, and (b) 
that policy decisions should be taken by citizens rather than experts.  
 
1. Modernism and the ends of social science 
 
Bevir’s argument for the democratisation of governance rests upon his wider rejection of 
epistemological universalism in social science, and of the assumption of expertise which he sees 
flowing from it. Modernist social science, he argues, strives to reveal objective laws about society 
and politics through the observation of social institutions and processes. These laws are 
grounded in assumptions about rationality most commonly associated either with neo-classical 
economics or with modern sociology. Those who posit the centrality of economic rationality to the 
study of social behaviour tend to understand social relationships on instrumentalist grounds, as 
things which either facilitate or impede the satisfaction of individual preferences. Furthermore, 
they assume people to be ‘autonomous individuals whose preferences are formed and whose 
reasoning is secured outside of all particular cultures’ (Bevir, 2010; 261). Those who posit the 
centrality of sociological rationality, on the other hand, tend to ‘replace instrumentality with 
appropriateness’, arguing that acting rationally is not so much about maximising one’s individual 
utility as it is about performing one’s social role appropriately, by obeying the various norms 
attendant to that role (Bevir, 2010; 22). For all their differences, both approaches share an 
important claim: that it is an important task of the social scientist, if not their most important task, 
to reveal objective laws of social life grounded in rationality which can explain current and existing 
behaviour, and predict future behaviour too.  
 
This central assumption unites defenders of economic and sociological rationality in ways that are 
not often pointed out in the literature. Modernist social science, for Bevir, is premised upon the 
idea that human behaviour can be explained, and predicted, by an appeal to standards of 
rationality which are determined independently of any particular social, cultural, or historical 
context. Modernist social science is both acultural and ahistorical in the sense that sociological 
rationality and economic rationality are held by their defenders to be capable of stipulating with 
reasonable certainty what any rational individual will do at any particular time in any particular 
context: they will either do those things which they think will maximise their individual utility or, if 
one takes a more sociological view, they will decide whether or not to act in accordance with 
prevailing social norms. Human behaviour is thus explainable according to standards of rationality 
which hold true for all people across all cultures and in all times, and hence, it is not necessary for 
social scientists to engage with the historical or cultural contexts in which individuals exist in order 
to know how they will act in any given circumstance. Rather, they need only gather enough 
information about the current ordering of social relations to work out what it would be rational for 
people to do in the circumstances in which they find themselves. 
 
The picture that Bevir offers is therefore different to the one we are used to. On the traditional 
picture, social science is described as being split between those who emphasise economic 
rationality (and, therefore, the pursuit of objective social facts), and those who emphasise 
sociological rationality (and, therefore, the importance of social norms and social meanings). The 
former approach is typically associated with the positivism of thinkers like Auguste Comte, is 
typically described as arising out of a respect for the advances made in the natural sciences, and 
is generally held to be most recently exemplified in rational choice theory, behaviouralism, and 
the economic theories of thinkers like Smith and Hayek. In the field of public policy analysis they 
are most closely associated with the rise of New Public Management, and specific public sector 
reforms (such as privatisation and the outsourcing of the delivery of public services to non-state 
actors) initiated by Neo-Liberals like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan who were concerned 
about the power of centralised bureaucracies to dominate the policy making process, undermine 
efficiency, and stifle radicalism (e.g. Hood, 1991; Barzelay, 2001). The latter approach, on the 
other hand, tends to be associated with the work of sociologists like Weber and, more recently, 
Bourdieu, who have in their own ways rejected the straightforward application of natural science 
methodologies in social science, in favour of an approach which takes into account subjective 
aspects of social life which they believe are rendered invisible by positivism (Weber, 1922; 
Bourdieu, 1991).  
 
Bevir controversially argues that both approaches should be rejected, and that both, in their own 
ways, are associated not just with the kind of reforms initiated by the Neo-Liberals, but also with 
New Labour’s commitment to joined-up government, big tent politics, evidence-based policy, and 
the desire to tackle social problems via their prior social causes. The reason for this, he suggests, 
is that positivists and anti-positivists are in fact united in their claim that social science should be 
concerned with the establishment of universal laws which govern social life, which can be used to 
explain and predict human behaviour across a range of social contexts, and which, therefore, 
form the basis of a particular expertise. ‘Both modernist economists and modernist sociologists 
compartmentalize aspects of society so as to manage and explain facts,’ he argues. ‘They seek 
to make sense of the particular . . . by reducing it to formal midlevel or universal generalizations 
that hold across time and space’ (Bevir, 2010; 23). Consequently, for modernist social scientists 
of either stripe, the purpose of social science is to establish universal laws that describe 
demonstrable relations of cause and effect which can be used to inform public policy responses 
to particular social problems. The resulting policy solutions can then be implemented across 
society, and across societies. Modernist social science thus equips academics (and, 
consequently, policy makers) with an expertise in analysing and resolving complex social 
problems by laying bare the ways in which individuals (understood as rational actors) will act in 
response to specific social stimuli.  
 
Modernism thus embodies an incoherent epistemological position with regard to social 
knowledge, he argues. In aiming at the establishment of objective, ahistorical, universal laws of 
cause and effect, modernist social science ignores the inherently contingent and unpredictable 
nature of social life, and of our own individual ideas about the world and our place within it. It 
assumes that social scientists and agents can examine society and politics from the outside, from 
a plateau of pure reason which exists separately from, or above, society, and that they are 
therefore able to reason about society and politics in a way that is untainted by their own 
particular ideas, values, and experiences. Bevir asks that we reject this approach, in particular the 
idea that the content of rationality can be stipulated independently of the context in which social 
actors find themselves. Reasoning, he suggests, ‘always takes place against a background of a 
particular subjective or intersubjective web of beliefs. While the content of the relevant web of 
beliefs varies from case to case, there is no possibility of reasoning outside of any such 
background.’ (Bevir, 261, emphasis added).  
 
In this respect, Bevir’s rejection of modernist social science, the expertise arising from it, and the 
appeal to objective reason that it embodies, can be seen to share the same root as claims made 
by other thinkers from across the political spectrum who have, for one reason or another, rejected 
the appeal to universal reason as an appropriate source of knowledge about society, politics or 
anything else. For all their many differences, communitarian critics of liberalism (e.g. Sandel 
1982,1986; MacIntyre, 1988; Taylor, 1992, 1995), poststructuralist critics of rationalism (e.g. 
Foucault, 1989), and critical theorists of positivism (e.g. Adorno, 1973; Habermas, 1989) are 
nevertheless united with other philosophers like Hillary Putnam, W.V.O. Quine, Richard Rorty, 
and Bernard Williams in questioning the idea that knowledge can be, and should aspire to be, 
objective and universal rather than subjective and particular (Putnam, 1990; Quine, 1951, 1960, 
1970; Rorty, 1989; Williams, 1972). Thomas Nagel has identified the work of these philosophers 
as exemplifying a rise in philosophical subjectivism (Nagel, 1997). Bevir has associated them with 
the emergence of what he calls ‘post analytic’ philosophy (Bevir, 1999). Whatever we choose to 
call it, however, the conclusion for Bevir is clear: once we take seriously the embeddedness of 
individual agents in particular cultural, social, and political frameworks we are forced to relinquish 
the modernist presumption that it is possible (or appropriate) to adopt a ‘view from nowhere’ and 
to reason about the world from a plateau of unfettered reason which exists independently of our 
various attachments and memberships, and which determines what is ‘rational’ for us to do in any 
given context. Social and cultural particularity undermines the universality sought by modernist 
social science, he argues, and hence, the point of social science is not to come up with timeless 
laws rooted in universal norms of rationality, but to describe and explain social behaviour in terms 
of the overlapping and often conflicting ideals, understandings, and aspirations of those actors 
involved. It is, in fact, to come up with a conception of rationality the content of which arises out of 
the social, political, and cultural context in which agents are embedded. Social particularity, or 
contingency upsets the notion of expertise based on universal insights about human behaviour, 
and points to the changeable, contextual nature of our behaviour, as well as the importance of 
our own subjective ideas about the world in our decisions about how to act in response to the 
particular circumstances in which we find ourselves. Social science, far from being the pursuit of 
ahistorical, universal laws of cause and effect, he argues, should be interpretive: the social and 
political scientist should not stand aloof from her subject matter, but should study it from the 
inside, through an engagement with the subjective, ambiguous, and complex ideas and 
perceptions held by situated agents.  
 
2. Democracy, objectivity, and dialogue 
 
Bevir’s argument is radical, both for epistemology and for politics. It strikes against positivists, 
rational choice theorists, behaviouralists, and others who have assumed the importance of 
economic rationality in explaining and predicting social behaviour, and who believe that it is 
possible and appropriate to characterise all human action as the result of a calculation about what 
best maximises one’s own individual utility. It also strikes against defenders of sociological 
rationality who assert that rationality is simply, and in all cases, defined as submission to the 
norms and obligations arising out of one’s social roles. It has radical epistemological implications 
as it suggests that because our knowledge of the world is inevitably shaped by the background 
context of subjective values and meanings against which we reason, objective, universal 
knowledge is neither desirable nor possible. Politically, it is radical because in rejecting the 
concept of objective reason, Bevir not only rejects rational choice theory, behaviouralism and all 
those other academic approaches mentioned thus far. He also necessarily and explicitly rejects 
the liberal tradition, which has come to dominate Anglo-American political theory and practice, 
and which is the political expression of the modernist ideals that Bevir is against.  
 
Bevir has long been a critic of liberalism, and in Democratic Governance rejects it in favour of 
what he calls the radical democratic tradition (Bevir, 2001, 2005, 2010). The reason for this, 
straightforwardly, is that liberal politics is itself part of the problem: it cannot offer an alternative to 
modernist notions of universalism, ahistoricism, and individualism, because it is itself premised 
upon these very notions. Just as modernist social scientists have sought to establish social laws 
which are defined independently of the particular lived experiences of the individuals they 
describe, so liberal theorists have sought to establish rules of social and political life which draw 
their authority not from of the ideals or lived experiences of the people governed by them, but 
from wider, deeper truths about humanity and morality which are revealed by objective reason 
(e.g. Rawls, 1971, 1991 & 2002; Dworkin, 2002). That is, while modernist social scientists have 
provided the intellectual argument for the centralisation of political power among experts of one 
kind or another, liberal political theorists have shown how this might be done. Liberals have, in 
general, carried forward modernist aims by defending the establishment of representative 
institutions and constitutional arrangements aimed at keeping power out of the hands of citizens 
in general, and in the hands of those experts (judges, politicians, etc.) who have shown 
themselves to be capable of ruling in accordance with those wider, deeper moral rules revealed 
by objective reason. For Bevir, then, the democratisation of governance thus requires a rejection 
of the epistemological assumptions of modernism, its founding principles, and the liberal 
constitutionalism justified by it. It requires not just an interpretivist social science, but a more 
radical, democratic conception of society and politics premised upon substantive dialogue among 
historically and culturally embedded interlocuters, and a policy making process grounded in 
agreement and dialogue among situated agents as opposed to objective rules or principles 
revealed by experts. 
 
Herein lies a problem, however. Bevir’s claim that modernist social and political theory requires 
agents to adopt a ‘view from nowhere’ in order to derive universal, ahistorical grounds for the 
resolution of political questions is common among critics of liberalism, especially those who seek 
to replace what they see as the dull, elite-driven managerialism of liberal politics with a richer, 
more radically democratic model (Bevir, 2010). Radical democratic thinkers like Ernesto Laclau, 
Chantal Mouffe, Nancy Fraser, and Iris Marion Young have chastised liberals for their 
metaphysical and epistemological incoherences. For example, Young sought to debunk the 
empty notion of objectivity at the heart of liberalism in much the same ways as does Bevir, 
suggesting that it rests on the mistaken notion that parties to political dialogue should, in the 
interests of resolving political questions, ‘adopt a point of view outside concrete situations of 
action, a transcendental “view from nowhere” that carries the perspective, attributes, character 
and interests of no particular subject or subjects.’ (Young, 1990; 100). Bevir’s claim that it is 
‘impossible’ for people to reason outside of the framework of values and beliefs provided for them 
by the social context in which they are embedded, Young’s claim that ‘participants in political 
discussion cannot transcend their particularity’, and so on, are thus examples of a widespread 
and popular critique of not just of liberalism, but, more importantly, of the ‘modernist’ ideals upon 
which it is founded. (Young, 2000; 113). Young, like Mouffe, Laclau, and others like Fraser have 
generally invoked this argument against liberals in order to advance an alternative model of 
politics grounded in dialogue among situated agents, which, they think, avoids the need to invoke 
an unrealistic conception of reason or the individual (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Fraser, 1997).  
 
But the argument that people are embedded in webs of belief which they find ‘impossible’ to 
reason outside of does not represent an argument for a more democratic model of politics. This is 
because in order for democratic politics to yield the kind of agreements on matters of policy and 
institutional design that Bevir and others envisage, participants in political dialogue must be 
capable of doing precisely that which Bevir, Young, and others claim is impossible: they must be 
capable of establishing the requisite cognitive distance between ‘themselves’ and those ‘webs of 
belief’ which define and shape them to discuss them meaningfully with others who do not share 
them.  
 
Bevir is right that modernist social and political thought – and liberalism in particular - does indeed 
require individuals to abstract themselves from their particular ideals and lived experiences. But it 
does so in a particular way for particular reasons. Liberalism represents a pragmatic response to 
the specific problem of political disagreement and the possible conflicts which can arise out of it. 
That is, it represents a response to the fact that differently situated groups and individuals will 
often disagree profoundly about the right policy or course of action and that these disagreements 
will often not be resolvable without recourse to violence without an appeal to principles or rules 
which are not located in any particular tradition or set of experiences, but in more general claims 
which all parties to the dialogue can agree with irrespective of their more particular 
disagreements about more substantive matters. Locke’s defence of the principle of toleration 
was, after all, rooted in the observation that if state institutions were to be considered legitimate 
by a population divided on questions of religious truth, then these institutions must necessarily 
draw their legitimacy independently of any particular account of religious truth (Locke, 1689 & 
1690). This theme remains dominant in more recent incarnations of liberalism too, particularly 
those ‘political’ forms of liberalism advanced by thinkers like John Rawls, Martha Nussbaum, and 
Charles Larmore, who seek to legitimate a liberal democratic order via agreements arising out of 
the exchange of public reasons which are themselves not grounded in particular ideals or ‘webs 
of belief’ (Rawls, 1991; Nussbaum, 1999; Larmore, 1987 & 1995). Contrary to the claims made by 
communitarian and other critics of liberalism, therefore, liberalism – and the modernist ideas upon 
which it is founded - does not presuppose the existence of individuals who are somehow 
understood in abstraction from the contexts which give their lives meaning, or that they must 
adopt a ‘view from nowhere’. Rather, it begins precisely in the assumption that people are deeply 
embedded in particular webs of belief, and that they will have particular ideals and values which 
they cherish and which they could not relinquish, which is precisely why controversial political 
questions cannot be legitimately resolved by an appeal to any one particular web of belief or set 
of values. Rather, they argue, the legitimate resolution to political questions such as the 
appropriate design of institutions and policies, come from a process of reflective deliberation 
among agents who are understood to have been shaped by the contexts in which they find 
themselves. The objectivity sought by liberalism is political not ontological. Individuals who are 
understood to be situated in particular contexts but who are also genuinely motivated to find 
agreement on constitutional and policy matters will, when faced with profound disagreement, 
voluntarily modify their language in ways which move the argument onto more common ground. 
They will, that is, seek grounds for agreement which are more ‘objective’ in the sense that they 
are not rooted in any particular account of the good life, or set of lived experiences, in order that 
they can gain the assent of radically different people, from different traditions, who are embedded 
in different webs of belief. 
 
It is this voluntary move on the part of the parties to political dialogue from the particular to the 
general – the subjective to the objective – which Bevir, Young, and others would appear to 
believe is impossible. But this is a very strong claim indeed, and one which appears to undermine 
both the possibility of a liberal form of politics and a more radically democratic one. For if people 
are just unable to establish sufficient distance from any of their particular values, beliefs, ideals, 
or experiences to discuss them in ways which others can find intelligible, then it is difficult to 
envisage the prospect of any kind of agreement on political questions at all. Political dialogue 
between such radically situated agents will end in stalemate. 
 
Liberals suggest that such a conclusion can be avoided because it is possible and appropriate for 
parties to political dialogue, if they are genuinely motivated to reach agreement with others, to 
offer reasons for and against particular proposals and arguments which are ‘objective’ in the 
sense that they are not rooted entirely in controversial or partial accounts of truth, or beliefs or 
ideals which are not stipulated by particular webs of belief. Bevir, Young, and other critics of 
liberalism (or the modernist principles upon which it is founded) reject this approach as 
embodying a ‘view from nowhere’. They are therefore required to come up with an alternative 
explanation of how diverse individuals, all of whom are so firmly embedded in their webs of belief 
that to think beyond them for the purposes of reaching political agreements is impossible, can 
nevertheless converge on agreements which are substantive enough to legitimate specific policy 
outcomes, institutional arrangements, and constitutional provisions which are considered 
appropriate and supportable by all. Bevir has touched on this elsewhere, arguing that such 
agreement is possible as long as the deliberative process is conceived as a discourse between 
situated individuals who view one another as equals with whom they feel empathy (Bevir, 2001). 
But this does not deal with the liberal concern that radically different people may be so divided 
over matters of substance that they may find empathy difficult or even impossible. Bevir says little 
more on the matter in Democratic Governance and instead speaks in vague terms about the 
need for a ‘pluralist and participatory democracy built around diverse openings and support for 
citizens to develop voice, enter dialogues, and rule themselves.’ (Bevir, 2010; 273) But while 
participation and dialogue are all very well, it is difficult to see what these dialogues might yield in 
terms of policy outcomes if the parties to them are, as he suggests, unable to look beyond their 
own subjective location in the world and the values which arise out of it.  
 
3. Democracy, expertise, and social justice 
 
In spite of all this, Bevir is nevertheless correct that modernist social and political theory, as 
exemplified in liberalism, tends to favour a constitutional regime in which the agreements struck 
between parties to political debate are used to justify the centralisation of decision-making power 
in representative institutions and non-majoritarian institutions, while the radical democratic 
tradition rejects such a move in favour of the retention of power among individuals themselves. 
Bevir is also right that talk of representative democracy has dominated political discourse in 
developed liberal democratic states and in Britain in particular.  
 
Recently, however, this has begun to change. Within the academy there has been a widespread 
and explicit move among many democrats to redefine democracy as a deliberative rather than 
representative system (e.g. Cohen, 1989; Fung & Wright, 2001; Gutmann & Thompson, 1998, 
2004). And outside the academy, a similar shift seems to be taking place. One of the most 
striking things about British politics in the past three or four years, for example, is the extent to 
which the dominant discourse of evidence-based policy, benchmarking, and joined-up 
government has been replaced by a wider cross-party unity on the need for stronger local 
democracy, civic renewal, and the devolution of power away from governmental or quasi-
governmental organisations toward citizens. The run-up to the 2010 general election saw all the 
main parties, and the vast majority of the more marginal ones, abandon traditional appeals to 
representative democracy and unite instead on the need for some form of localism. New Labour 
‘progressives’ argued for the devolution of power away from central institutions toward citizens in 
the interests of extending the ‘choice agenda’ (e.g. Milburn et al, 2008). The Liberal democrats 
and the Conservatives argued for richer local democracy, partly as a reaction to recent concerns 
among the electorate about MPs’ expenses and other scandals, but also in order to free citizens 
and local communities from the tyranny of non-elected experts residing in quangoes, or in the 
institutions of Europe, or elsewhere (e.g. Cameron et al, 2009). Furthermore, UKIP, the Green 
Party, the English Democrats, and the British National Party joined with more mainstream parties 
in stating in their manifestoes that the future for democratic reform in Britain lay in bringing power 
closer to the people. Think tanks from the left, right and centre of British politics have also 
embraced the general call for local democracy, with organisations as politically diverse as Policy 
Exchange, IPPR, the New Economics Foundation, and Civitas all arguing in favour of the idea 
that in the interests of strengthening democracy, power should move from central institutions 
(and, hence, from elected and non-elected experts) to local people who are better placed to 
identify local priorities and provide targeted policy solutions to local problems (e.g. Jenkins, 2004; 
McCarvill, 2010; Boyle, 2009; Beedham, 2006).  
 
Since its election in May 2010, the coalition government has proposed a raft of initiatives aimed at 
making good on this commitment to local democracy and, in particular, to the power of ordinary 
citizens to influence the funding and delivery of public services. Furthermore, it is clear that these 
reforms are driven by an explicit rejection of the idea of expertise, and of the elitest methods 
which Bevir identifies as driving policy formation and implementation under New Labour. One of 
the arguments made by ministers in favour of Free Schools, for example, is that they will wrest 
education from the grasp of experts and allow parents to set up and run schools as they see fit. 
Similarly, the idea that local policing priorities should be set by local people via elected police 
chiefs rests on the assumption that decisions about policing priorities, crime prevention, and 
police budgets should not be made by experts but by citizens. And the idea that decisions about 
such complex issues as planning, transport, and the provision of health and care services should 
be made by local people rather than MPs, Regional Development Agencies, Quangoes, or 
European Institutions suggests that it is one’s status as a citizen (or, more specifically in the case 
of localism, a resident of a particular geographical area) which renders one qualified to decide 
public policy as opposed to any particular expertise, specialised training, or experience. What we 
see in the localist agenda, therefore, is a break from centralised policy making but also, more 
fundamentally, a break from the need for ‘evidence-based’ policy, benchmarking, and the like. 
Policy decisions in this new climate are deemed legitimate or illegitimate depending upon the 
extent to which they are in accord with the expressed democratic will of the people who are to be 
subject to them, rather than the extent to which they are rooted in evidence gathered and 
analysed by social scientists.  
 
The widespread shift away from the traditional discourse of representative democracy toward a 
more localist, deliberative form of politics raises important questions about Bevir’s depiction of 
British politics. In one sense, it vindicates it. Bevir’s rejection of expertise and evidence-based 
policy, characteristic of New Labour and the Neo-Liberalism of the 1980s, appears to resonate 
with what has become a popular scepticism among politicians and the public about the ability of 
experts to provide the kind of certainty necessary to justify centralised, elitist decision making. 
Even the wisdom of legal experts and judges have come under scrutiny, with increasing numbers 
of politicians and campaigners arguing that decisions about the sentencing of criminals should be 
devolved down to citizens (see e.g. Carswell & Hannan, 2005, 2008). Bevir’s analysis of the 
situation in Britain goes a long way in explaining the deep-seated cynicism among the public 
about British democracy, and about the motives of politicians: it provides an analytical and 
historical explanation for the common (and, it seems, growing) feeling among the public that 
elections are becoming less and less meaningful, as policy decisions are becoming increasingly 
the province not of elected representatives, but an unelected coterie of advisors, activists, groups, 
and organisations who are assumed to have the knowledge and expertise necessary to govern 
on behalf of the ignorant masses. 
 
On the other hand, however, the increased willingness among politicians, political practitioners, 
activists, and the media to embrace a more deliberative form of politics in place of traditional 
representation makes clearer the potential problems with such an approach. The most obvious of 
these, and one which Bevir himself identifies, is the tension between the desire to establish more 
democratic forms of politics with the concurrent desire to ensure greater social justice among the 
population as a whole. One of the most powerful arguments in favour of representative 
democracy is that powerful, reflective institutions which are grounded in the popular assent of the 
people are more able to make difficult (and often unpopular) decisions in the name of social 
justice than more radically democratic ones. Society is characterised by diversity on a huge scale, 
the argument goes; different citizens have different ideals and values, different experiences, have 
access to different resources, and require different things from democratic institutions. Not 
everyone can get what they want all the time: citizens will have competing desires, and will make 
competing claims for scarce resources. In such circumstances it is important that our political 
representatives are able to make reflective and responsible choices even though, in doing so, 
they will inevitably cause some to be disappointed or resentful at the outcome. Representative 
institutions arguably ensure a degree of fairness in the resolution of political conflicts which is 
absent in more deliberative systems in which decisions are taken by the people at large, and they 
defend minority interests against the overbearing majority, and hence, help to provide a 
normative justification for policies such as the alleviation of poverty, progressive taxation, and the 
protection of minority cultural and religious practices. 
 
The call to reduce the role of central representative institutions in the decision making process 
and increase the decision making of citizens as a whole raises the question of how the 
democratic safeguards traditionally provided by liberal constitutionalism and representative 
democracy might be otherwise maintained (or, more fundamentally, what their justification might 
be in a more radically democratic context). One particular issue here is the fact that deliberative 
decision making procedures run the risk of entrenching precisely the kind of pre-existing 
inequalities that representative democracy is (when working properly) designed to remedy, and 
social democrats in particular are most concerned about. For example, Bevir notes that many 
liberal democratic states are experiencing declining levels of political engagement among their 
citizens. But arguably, the problem is not so much the widespread disengagement of citizens with 
formal and informal political activities, but rather the disproportionately high levels of political 
engagement among citizens of a high socio-economic status, and the disproportionately low 
levels of engagement among those of a low socio-economic status. As countless studies have 
shown, propensity to engage in a range of civic and political activities, from voting, lobbying MPs, 
and attending local political meetings, to signing petitions and taking part in demonstrations is 
closely associated with the level of education and economic resources citizens have at their 
disposal, with wealthier, more educated citizens engaging at significantly higher rates across the 
board than poorer, less educated ones (e.g. Lijphart, 1997; Macedo et al, 2005; Hansard Society 
& Electoral Commission, 2008; Parvin, 2005, 2009, 2010; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; 
Chong & Olivera, 2008; Keany & Rogers, 2006; Muller, 1988). This fact brings the tension 
between democracy and social justice into sharp relief. For if we are at all concerned about social 
justice, then the answer to our concerns about democracy cannot simply be to hand power down 
to citizens. Straightforwardly devolving power down to local people, or to citizens in general, 
merely places power in the hands of those citizens who are already politically active, and who 
have the inclination and resources necessary to make use of the power that they are given, and 
excludes those who are not, and do not have these resources. There is a danger, therefore, that 
Bevir’s vision of a more deliberative, dialogic model of decision making and policy formation 
would make it easier for the middle classes to dominate policy making, and to drive through 
decisions which address their concerns at the expense of the concerns of others. 
 
We see concerns of precisely this kind in Britain aired by those who remain sceptical of the desire 
among politicians and others to devolve decision making power down to local communities and 
citizens. Their concern is, broadly speaking, that under such a system the tyranny of experts is 
merely replaced by the tyranny of the wealthy (e.g. Walker, 2002a, 2002b; Parvin, 2009). Hence, 
they say, the British government’s plan to wrest power from experts in the areas of education, 
policing, planning, and so on will inevitably disproportionately benefit the most advantaged 
members of society at the expense of the least advantaged as it will be they who run the Free 
Schools, decide what the police should spend their time doing, decide what kind of health care 
should be provided in their area, and what buildings get planning permission in their 
neighbourhoods. Advocates of deliberative or dialogic policy making therefore need to explain 
how they will safeguard against this. Bevir does not do so, although he at least acknowledges 
that it is a problem. Elsewhere, for example, he has suggested that his ‘postfoundationalist’ 
conception of democratic dialogue would produce socially just outcomes by encouraging all 
participants to ‘treat each other as they do themselves’ by ensuring that they all have the ‘level of 
mutual comfort, education, and the like’ to pursue their own good in their own way (Bevir, 2001; 
60-61). In Democratic Governance, Bevir offers a similar vision of democratic deliberation in 
which diverse people get together to share their stories and, through doing so, come to converge 
on decisions which are fair and inclusive. This is a noble hope, and one which most democrats 
and liberals would support. But Bevir does not provide much guidance as to what should be done 
if participants in political dialogue do not, or are not able to, treat one another as Bevir hopes they 
will. Parties to dialogue may well understand, through the mutual ‘telling of stories’ within a 
democratic forum, that people need an appropriate bundle of social, economic, and other 
resources in order to pursue their particular ends, but they might (collectively or individually) 
reject the ends that some people want to pursue as unworthwhile or mistaken. Such 
disagreements about what makes life worthwhile, and how people should live their lives, is the 
very stuff of politics. The collective telling of stories via democratic discourse may well make the 
aims and interests of interlocutors more transparent to all involved, but it does not follow that 
these same interlocutors will look kindly or humanely on these interests. They may learn that they 
dislike or even hate them. What then? Again, without a more detailed explanation of how the 
ideals of democracy and social justice might be reconciled in the absence of representative 
institutions and liberal constitutional checks against the whims of majorities and fellow 
deliberators, Bevir’s positive argument for democratic governance can only be a partial one. 
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